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Three major issues have emerged from adjustment lending. One
is translating adjustment policies into improved economic per-
formance. The second is reconciling policy reforms with chang-
ing external conditions. The third  is coordinating the adjustment
process itself - coordinating the efforts of all the interested
parties, inside and outside the country. In relation to each of
these issues, expanding the menu of policy options could make
adjustment packages more credible and effective.
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thc authors, relnect only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly.  The findings, interpmrations, and conclusions are the
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Poiy  lanning,  and Resaeuch
Trade  Policy
Reaping thc full benefit of adjustmcnt packages  - and complementary policies and nonprice
depends on a govcrnment's commitment to  considerations.
reform as wcll as a variety of complementary
factors, many  of which have not been duly  Getting the mostfrom  external strategy.
considered because of the lack of time, re-  Much of the Bank's intellectual and financial
sources, and skiHls.  effort has supported an outward orientation and
market liberalization. But confusion remains
Most policy packages have focused on  over what these charnges  really mean, about
adjustment in the following areas:  (1) fiscal and  what is really being sought, and about how
investment policy, (2) exchange rate and trade  much is being reformed. Needed now is a
reform, (3) industrial regulation, (4) agricultural  clearer understanding of the respective roles of
pricing, (5) financial liberalization, and (6)  domestic policy and extemal factors in increas-
institutional development. No small task.  ing trade and accelerating gtowth.
Meanwhile, concerns have been voiced that too
much is being attempted - or, where sociopo-  Improving the adjustment process. Prepar-
litical issues arc ignored, too little.  edness ftc the reforms has been important for
their implementation and sustainability. Timely
It is becoming increasingly clear that if  financing for the adjustment package has also
these packages are.  to be more cffective and  becn a key to acceptability. Building a domestic
credible, the menu of policy options might be  consensus, essential to sustaining stabilization
expanded in three areas. One is translating  and adjustment efforts, requires commitment
adjustment poljeies into improved economic  and the ability to experiment. Providing
performance -L the objective of domestic  adequate finance requires coordinated rather
strategy. The second is reco;iciling policy  than fragmented efforts by donors, commercial
reforms with changing external conditions to  lenders, and the respective governments.
get the most from the external strategy. The
third is improving the process of adjustment  In sum: attention needs to be placed on the
itself. So, an already onerous set of tasks has to  commitment to price reforms and on nonprice
become even broader-  or, better, more  areas. Support might increase for the outward
focused.  orientation of countries - if discussions are
extended to consider external factors and if
Linking policies to performance. Although  nondistortionary ways of promoting domestic
the links among policy change, funding, and  production are explored. There must also be
economic retums might seem clear, identifying  greater government commitment to building
them in practice is complex. Efforts to clarify  support for the reforms - as well as flexibility
the expected effects of policy on performance  in the external financing community.
should continue. There ncvertheless are practi-
cal difficulties, some of them unpredictable.  This paper is a product of the Trade Policy
Policies may be better, but financing may be  Division, Country Economics Department. For
inadequate. Also influencing the effectiveness  copies contact Carmen Hambidge, room
of reforms arc their credibility and sustainability  N8-069, extension 61539.
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
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1.  An  Overview
A  combination of  unfavorable external circumstances  and
inadequate  domestic  policies  led to t.4e  economic  and debt problems  of
the  developing  countries  in the  first  half  of the 1980s. As the  decade
progressed,  it  became  clear  that  for  many  countries  a  return  to  previous
long-term  growth  would  require  significant  adjustments:  this  was true
even for some that had avoided a debt crisis.  At the same time,
repaying debt  and  implementing structural adjustments  called  for
increased  financing  from  domestic  and  external  sources. Such  financing
hinged,  however,  on changes  in the  status  quo  --  not  only  in  domestic
policies  but also in external  financing  provided  by multilateral,
co=mercial,  and  government  sources.
A major  tomponent  in  the  evolution  of  the  World  BankWs  role  in
this connection  was the expansion  of  adjustment  lending.  The
development  of the Structural  Adjustment  Loan  (SAL)  and the  Sectoral
Adjustment  Loan (SECAL)  since  1979-80  may also  be representative  of
recent  trends  in  conditionality  of  adjustment  lending  in  general.  1/ As
a percentage  of total  lending,  adjustment  lending  has grown  from  an
average  of  10  percent  in  FY8O-85  to  23  percent  in  FY87,  over  four-fifths
of  the  latter  constituted  by  SECALs.  Some  fifty  countries,  many  of  them
1/ Discussions  of  the  Bank's  adjustment  lending  can  be  found  in  World
Bank (1088),  (1987b),  (1987c),  (1987d),  (1986a),  (1986b),  Baneth
(1983),  Please  (1984),  Stern  (1983).-2-
low-income  African  cowntries  or highly  indebted  middle-income  countries,
have received  adjustment  loans. This type  of lending  was not,  however,
a complete  break with traditional  lending  and conditionality,  but a
developwent  of "program"  lending  to encompass  much  greater  emphasl.  on
polily  reform.  1/
At Its inception  the SAL  war seen  as a primary  instrument  for
the Bank's  dialogue  on the fundamental  aspects  of development  policy
with  the  borrowing members.  Adjustment lending differed  from
traditional  lending in  its focus on broad economy-  and sector-wide
policy  reform  --  and on making  foreign  exchange  available  quickly  to
finance  imports  not  necessarily  linked  to specif  restments.  2/  The
approach  was to link the  increased  availability  of toreign  exchange  to
expected improvements  in  economic performance.  Such  policy-based
lending  nevertheless  identifies  several  key  analytical  aspezcs  and  some
difficult  and controversial  Issues:  among them,  the relation  between
policy  and  performance,  the  adjustment  strategy  under  changing  external
conditions,  and  the  political  economy  of the  process. Concerns include
1/  The  Bank has  engaged in  program lending since 1946 when  its
Executive  Directors  determined  the  consistency  of such  lending  with
Its Articles  of Agreement  under "special  circumstances." These
"special  circumstances"  were Identified  with  war, natural  disaster,
precipitous changes In  external trade  conditions, and  cases
Involving  structural  constraints  or capacity  under-utilization.  The
Executive  Directors  also accepted  at various times  the assessment
that such program lending might amount to 10 percent of  total
lending  commitments.
2/  Parallel  to the development  of the SAL was the development  of an
analogous  IDA (interest-free)  instrument  to support  adjustment  In
lower  income  countries. This instrument,  the  Structural  Adjustment
Credit  (SAC),  serves  the  same function  as the SAL.  But bteause  it
Is Interest  free and longer in maturity,  It has a higher grant
element. "SAL"  is  used  here to  refer  to  both  SALs  and  SACs.-3-
the conditionality  of  lending  and its effectiveness,  problems  of
monitoring,  and  the  sustainabillty  of  reform. The  concerns  sometimes
also relate  to the speed and scope of reform  and the country
environment,  Some  say that too  much  was attempted  (in  a so-called
Christmas-tree  approach),  and some,  too  little  (if  sociopolitical  and
ethical  issues  were  ignored).
One  major  issue  in  policy-based  lending,  discussed  in  section
2,  is  the  link between  domestic  policy changes and  economic
performance.  Domestic  policy  changes  usually  supported  by  adjustment
programs  have  involved  incentives  for  resource  reallocation,  inducements
for  savings  and  iavestment,  redirection  of  public  investment  priorities,
and  often  a variety  of sector-level  reforms. It has  been  easier  to
assess  whether  conditionalities  have  been  met  than  how  well  they  have
been  sustained.  It  has  been  evsn  harder  to  conclude  how  they  have  been
related  to  performance  or how  much  worse  performance  would  have  been
without  these  efforts.  The  reason  is  that  performance  involves  growth
rates,  external  sector  and  fiscal  balances,  income  distribution,  etc.
which  are  the  simultaneous  results  of  past  policies,  new  policies,  lags
in  effects,  external  factors,  measurement  problems  and  so  on.
A second  major  issue,  discussed  in section  3, is the link
between  the  agreed  policy  and  lending,  or  more  generally  between  policy
and  the  external  environment.  The  greater  the  reforms,  the  greater  the
returns  from  external  financing.  The  actual  financing  depends  not  only
on  this  increased  warranted  support,  but  also  on  the  new  financing  gap-4-
that  results  inter  alia  from  the  adjustment  effort.  The  financing  must
also  reconcile  debt implications,  including  that  of additional  borrowing
(which  are not addressed  here.)  This connection  between  policy  and
financing  highlights  the  special  role  of trade  expansion  reforms. If
imports  respond  faster  than  exports,  trade  reforms  would  need  to be
supported  by  additional  external  resources  in  the  short  term.
Trade  reforms have been the most significant  component  of
adjustment  lending  and  Bank  advice  in the 1980.. About  half  the  Bank's
sector adjustment lending in  fiscal 1987 primarily  supported trade
libe.ralization  in five large  borrowers: Argentina,  Indonesia,  Jamaica,
Mexico,  and Nigeria.  A wide range of studies  quoted in World Bank
(1987a) concern the positive  relationship  between  trade reforms for
greater  outward-orientation  and performance.  Edwards  (1985),  Frenkel
(1982),  and  Papageorgiou,  Michaely,  and  Choksi  (1986)  have  examined  the
phasing  and  sequencing  of outward-oriented  trade  reforms. Corbo  and  de
Melo (1987),  Fischer  (1986)  and Mussa  (1987)  have been concerned  with
the  interrelations  among  trade  and  macroeconomic reforms during
adjustment.  Dornbusch  (1987)  and Sachs  (1986)  have  questioned  the
wisdom of trade liberalization  and the effectiveness  of the Bank's
conditionality.  On the  whole,  much has been  written  on the  merits  and
problems  of  trade  liberalization.  Needed  now  is  a  clarification  of  the
concepts  and a  synthesis  of the evidence  and operationally  useful
results.
A  third  major issue  in the process  of adjustment  is the
coordination  of  domestic  and  external  players  (section  4). Consenous-
building  has  been  receiving  much  attention  as  a domestic  element  In  the-5-
policy  adjustment.  The  reason  is  that  stabilization  programs  initiated
in crisis  conditions  have usually  permitted  little  input from  or
flexibility  by  the  recipient.  Medium-term  programs  should  for  the  most
part  be  outside  crisis  con'f-t'ons,  but  in  reality  a crisis  may  prompt
the policy  changes.  Expc  Eence suggests  that the acceptance  of
conditions  in the financing  agreement  by the member  country  --
reflecting  an agreement  on their  appropriateness  on the  part  of the
policymakers  --  is  essential  for  the  sustainability  of  reforms.
There  nevertheless  are  further  analytical  and  practical  issues
that  have  yet  to  be  understood  adequately.  For  example,  how  credible  is
the government  in assuring  the irreversibility  of reforms? While
conditionality  defines  the  program  instrument,  the  intention  of  the  tool
is  that  the  financing  program  is  to  be  agreed  on  in  conjunction  with  the
policies  being  accepted  as beneficial  by  the  country  and  the  external
agency.  Preferably,  the country  would adopt stabilization  and
adjustment  measures,  and  external  financing  would  be  provided  in  support
of those  measures.  There  thus  is  the  need  for  coordination  among  the
recipient  country, developed  countries,  external agencies,  and
commercial  banks  In  ensuring  consistency  among  policy  reforms,  financing
and  debt  implications.
Work is now needed  to clarify  the scope of adjustment
lending. First,  analytical  work  relating  policy  to  performance  must
continue,  contributing  to an adequate  apparatus  for evaluation  and
monitoring  of adjustment  programs. While  the  use of well-conceived
indicators  could  help,  country  applications  of  small,  prototype  models
are also likely  to be essential. Second,  in the area  of external-6-
policy, there Is  confusion  even about what  various  concepts  mean  --
outward  orientation,  trade  liberalization,  and  export  promotion.  Nor  is
It fully  clear  what exactly  has been  accomplished: greater  efficiency
in the  import  regime,  less  protectlon,  more uniform  protection,  greater
export  incentives,  and  so on.  Third,  there  is a need  to  expand  the  menu
of policy optins  In  the discussion  of  adjustment  programs.  For
external  policies,  more work is needed  on factors  that should  not be
taken  as given,  or if they are, on what those factors  Imply  for the
adjustment  effort. For  domestic  policies,  it  has  been  demonstrated  that
while better price signals are essential,  the supply response  also
depends  on getting  non-price  factors  right.
2.  Frameworks  for  Policy  Reform
Policy  and  Performance
A number  of  papers  have  set  out  rationale  for  stabilization  and
adjustment  and the  Intended  linkage  between  policy  change  and  financing
(see  for axample  Balassa  1982,  IMF 1987,  Khan 1987,  Michalopoulos  1987,
Khan 1986,  Yagei,  1985,  Killick  1984). A broad  goal  of  adjustment  ip  to
raise  the  growth  rate  of the  economy  over  the  medium-term,  to return  It
to its potential  path from which It may have diverged  and perhaps  to
facilitate  an expansion of the potential itself.  Stabilization  Is
consistent  with this  goal,  although  the  primary  focus  has often  had  to
be placed  upon balance  of payments  and fiscal  disequilibria  associated
with  increased  absorption.  Policies  supported  by stabilization  programs
and adjustment  efforts  overlap  - for example  exchange  rate  adjustment- 7  -
for expenditure  switching  --  and consistency  among them is necessary.
Viable  medium-term  programs  require  attention  to expenditure  policies
associated  with  stabilization,  as  part of  any  effort to  promote
expenditure  switching  and Improve  resource  allocation  and the  structure
of  production, induce  resource mobilization,  and  promote better
investment  allocations  and sectoral  responses  --  all of which are part
of adjustment  programs,  or perhaps  development  strategies. The time
frame  of analysis  of stabilization  and adjustment  frameworks,  however,
ought  to be long  enough  to  ensure  consistency  in poliev  recommendations
and  In  their  external  financing  implications.
While the relation  between  policy  change,  funding  support  and
economic  returns  might  seem  clear,  Identifying  this  linkage  in practice
Is  quite  complex. From  a conceptual  point  of view,  identification  of  an
appropriate  policy  program is the result  of an analysis  of economic
functions relative to  a  country's economic objectives.  In  the
neoclassical  paradigm of  system function, an  efficient program is
generated  by the.  function  of marke.  Institutions  and market  signals.
The financial  and institutional  support  by international  organizations
might  constitute  an  effort  to strengthen  the  market  forces,  to  fill  gaps
where market  mechanisms  are not the sole answer  and to stress  public
investment  and Institutional  factors  wherever relevant  and possible.
The latter type of concerted  action would sometimes  reflect socio-
economic objectives, and  almost  always  reflect the  effects of
externalities  associated  with Institution  structures  and  other  relevant
aspects  of the development. The context  for adjustment  programs  and
conditionality  is  usually  the  world  of the  second  best.The  theory  of function  In  second  beet  contexts,  however,  is  not
well developed  and this state of affairs  qualitatively  changes the
approach  that %sust  be taken in designing  appropriate  policy  programs.
This Is In part a result  of the fact that chafges  that will lead to
Improvements  ln the first  best  context  may  sometimes  have the  opposite
effect  in second  bcst situations. This means that policy  approaches
might  be limited  to areas  where policy  effects  can be seen  as clearly
Improving  the situation.  It means that the identl'--  ':ion  of  the
relationship  between  change  and outcome  must be made also  on the  basis
of the  particular  country  context.
The  analysis of  policy effects and  their measurement  has
occurred at  two  levels  - the  aggregate (or  macro)  level  and
disaggregated  (sectoral)  level.  Some aggregative  modelling of the
effects has  also been tried, with modest results.  The aggregate
analysis  has  focussed  on  broad efficiency  issues such as:  gains
accruing from removing biases between tradeable and  non-tradeable
activity;  public  sector investment  choices;  and effects of financing
policy  and real interest  rates on domestic  resource  mobilization  and
allocation.  Analysis at  the  disaggregated level  has  included
institution  design,  use of quantitative  constraints,  effects  of tax  and
subsidy  wedges,  and the role,  organization  and function  of parastatal
enterprises. Methods for quantifying  the effects  of changes  at the
micro  level  seem to have more acceptance  even If they  are approximate.
Nevertheless,  tracing  the  sector  level  effects  of  macroeconomic  policies
empirically has  proved complex for  data  and  conceptual reasons.
Analysis  at the aggregate,  macro level,  on the other hand, has been_9-
subject  to  more debate: the links  between  trade  regime  orientation  and
growth,  for  example,  have  been  challenged.
Country  Experiences:  An Illustration
The  six  countries (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Pakistan, the
Philippines  and Senegal)  included in Table 1  are diveose In their
structures  and  the  stresses  which  the  external  environment  has  placed  on
thea. While  tho  other  countries  suffered  from  changes  In  torus  of trade
In  1979-82, Senegal and  Mexico  benefitted fron  those  changes.
Philippines  and  Senegal suffered serious losses as  a  result of  a
slowdown  in the volume  of world  trade  while  all six  countries  incurred
substantial  losses  as a result  of higher  world  interest  rates. In two
areas  of policy  action,  the  exchange  rate  and  public  sector  deficit,  it
Is seen that the relationship  between  policy  and performance  at the
macro level cannot  be simplistically  viewed.  The complexity  of the
problem  has  to be recognized  both  with respect  to overall  policy  inter-
action  and the dynamic timing  of effects.  Chile  and Pakistan,  with
depreciated  real  exchange  rates  - but increased  fiscal  deficlts  - have
found  differlng  results  on the  current  account  deficits  and  growth. (In
Chile  the  appreciated  exchange  rate in 1980-82  led to  high Indebtedness
and the need for restrictions,  which added to the current account
deficit through high  interest charges).  Philippines  with  some
appreciation  In the real exchange  rate  but reduced  government  deficit
managed to curtail the current account deficit, but this has been
accompanied  by  a severe  downturn  in  overall  growth.- 10  -
Tb.  1:  exsxs  AM POLICY  tF1'  AM PMW4ANU  - UWS1IAT
I.  IAL  EFECS  II.  OLIC=  EFFBCS
ERctenul Siwdk  as  % GNP  Oe  Index of  FAtfiuted  Governumnt
(AveEW 1979-82)  Real  Whan  RAte b/  Deficit  (Z GDP)  ci
Term  of  Export  Interest  Average  Averap
Trade  Volume  Rate  Tbtal  198D-3  1984  1985  1980-83  1964  1985
Pldistui  1.7  0.3  0.8  2.8  100.0  98.5  91.9  5.7  6.0
Philipplims  2.4  2.3  t.7  6.4  100.0  94.0  102.6  2.9  1.8
s.enpl  -3.2  3.1  1.2  1.1  100.0  96.0  105.5  7.3  e.  4.1
tdle  1.8  4  4.0  '2  100.0  79.9  61.4  0.1  4.4
1Brazil  3.3  0.4  1.9  5.7  100.0  83.6  82.6  2.6  e/  4.7
Modco  -3.9  0.7  2.7  -0.4  100.0  94.1  101.1  8.3  8.3
tITI.  FEVRE9  hMICA=S
Rea  Wort  irrest  Account Bale  GP
Growth Rate  (2)  d/  (%  GDP)  Growth Rate  (2)
Aerae  Average  Averae
198043  19E4  1985  198043  1964  1985  198043  1984  1985
Pdcistan  10.5  -12.5  14.2  -2.7  -2.2  -4.0  7.6  5.5  7.8
Philippirm  3.3  2.8  -3.9  -6.7  -3.9  0.0  3.3  -6.1  -4.4
Soutl  0.4  -3.0  2.7  -14.8  -11.3  -12.4  3.5  -4.5  3.8
Chtle  2.7  3.0  8.0  -9.2  -10.7  -8.3  -0.4  6.3  2.4
Brazil  11.3  24.0  -5.8  -4.8  0.0  -0.1  1.0  5.7  8.3
Mtido  21.0  9.2  -7.1  -2.5  2.5  0.7  2.6  3.7  2.7
a/  Exteral  g*drA  statistics  fmn  Balssa  and  mbarthy  (1964).  An inrease  in  the  tenr  of
trade  index  indileat  a  deerioration  In  the  term  of  trade.
b/  A decrem  in  tiw  index  teflects  a  deluatou  It  shold  be  noted  that  alternative
indicm  give  ratlhr  differnit  ustiites.
c/  ITe detinitions  vary  a  gret  deal.
f  Mhwtde  exports.
Rf  _Avers for  Ssuesgl  and Brazil  are  derived  fra  figuwes for  1980,  1982, and  1983.
f/  Not avaIZable.
Sourc:  B1las and  MtCarthy (1964),  World Bak Ata- 11  -
Observed  downturns  In  overall  growth  seem  to  be  at  the  heart  of
objections  to  adjustment  policies.  The  distinction  between
stabilization  and adjustment  is often  made,  although  as noted,  these
ought  to  be  viewed  as  part  of  the  same  process.  Stabilization  policy  Is
designed  to return  the economy  to a  supportable  equilibrium  path.
Associated  with  demand  management,  it presents  a short-term  trade-off
with  growth.  Empirical  evidence  on  this  trade-off,  however,  is  hard  to
assemble.  1/ Adjustment  incorporates  additional  policies  to improve  the
efficiency  and growth  of the economy  over the medium-term. Such
adjustment  is  consistent  and  necessary  for  growth:  the  exchange  rate  is
one crucial  variable  and getting  rid of overvaluation  can boost
performance.  There  is  still,  among  some  critics,  a  perception  that  the
generic  adjustment  perspective  leads  to  policies  which  are  constrictive
and  function  mainly  to  support  net  resource  transfers.  This  criticism
has been hard to answer  partly  because  of the previously  noted
uncertainties  in  the  dynamics  of  adjustment.
The Bank and the Fund  have been  heavily  involved  in this
process.  One  of  their  roles  has  been  to  assist  in  defining  the  program
and  establishing  an appraisal  mechanism. There  is also  the  role  of
helping  to  make  resources  available  through  the  continued  participation
by commercial  banks  and other  bilateral  and  multilateral  lenders  -
which  Invariably  relates  to the  debt  issue.  (Policies  of developed
1/ Donovan  (1982)  concluded  "that  in broad  terms,  program  countries
recorded  significant  reductions  In  their  external  deficit  while  they
exhibited  only  marginal  changes  in  their  growth  rates  of real  GDP
and  consumption.o."- 12  -
countries  are also of fundamental  concern  to the  developing  countrles,
particularly  in the trade  policy  area.)  Some of these Interrelations
are  mentioned  in  the  case  of  Colombia  In  section  4.  The  greater  country
detail and  the  longer time span of  data examined also  help  to
disentangle  some of the policy  effects  better  than in the  overview  of
six  cases  in  Table  1.  World  Bank  (1988)  indicates  an association  of  GDP
and  export  growth  with  the  introduction  of reform  programs  in two-thirds
of 16  countries  examined. The  paper  claims  no causal  connection.
Conditionality  and  Monitoring
In the case of structural  adjustment  lending  the elements  of
conditionality are  macroeconosic, often  supported with  sectoral
aspects.  The question  whether policy  or performance  ought to guide
conditionality  is not  an easy  one (see  Genberg  and  Swoboda  1987). Four
types of cases might be noted:  (1) Policies  are agreed  upon, and
performance  Is good;  (11) Policies  are agreed  upon,  but performance  is
poor;  (Lit)  Policies  are not  agreed  upon, but performance  Is  good;  and
(lv)  Policies  are  not  agreed  upon,  and  performance  is  poor.
The first  and last cases  might be viewed  as straightforward,
the  first  suggestlng  that  Incremental  lending  Is  warranted,  and  the  last
that not.  The third  situation  has been  used  by some to  argue  In favor
of focuslng  on performance,  which Independent  of policy  agreement,  Is
seen  as  a  justification  for  lending. This  could  be  an Instance  when  the
policy  to be agreed  upon needed  to be reconsidered,  and  actual  policy
was turning  out to be reasonable. However,  the  good  performance  might
not  be sustained  in  the  medium-term  and  agreement  on policy  would  indeed- 13  -
be needed  for  continued  good  performance.  The  second  case,  in some
sense,  supports  the  focus  on  policy  (as  the  first  and  the  fourth).  It
takes  time  for  policy  effects  to  work  themselves  out.  In  such  cases,
even  if performance  has not  picked  up, improved  policy  could  be the
basis  for  additional  lending.  On  the  other  hand,  this  case  might  also
signal  the  need  to  revise  agreements  on  policy.
While  the  foregoing,  by  and  large,  support  the  focus  on  policy
agreements  for conditionality,  mitigating  circumstances  also become
evident.  Perhaps,  a  desirable  focus  would  be  on  Intermediate  objectives
in  terms  of  policy  performance,  which  is  to  be  reviewed  on  the  basis  of
accumulating  evidence.  Areas  for  policy  performance  monitoring  comprise
macroeconomic  and  sectoral  spheres.  There  remains  a serious  gap  with
regard  to the  tools  of  analysis  needed  for  monitoring  and  evaluation.
By  and  large,  these  have  relied  upon  available  indicators  of  policy  and
performance.  To  a limited  extent  policy  modelling  has  been  carried  out
at the  Bank.  1/  It  would  seem  fruitful  to  pursue  the  application  of
small,  prototype  models  for  policy  evaluation.
Turning  to actual  conditionality,  the  main areas  have been
trade  reform,  fiscal,  financial  and Investment  policy,  sectoral  and
institutional  reforms,  but  with  varying  degrees  of  implementation  and
effectiveness.  Support  for  change  in trade  policy  is  the  most  coomon
feature  in adjustment  lending,  and it is in direct  support  of the
resource  reallocation  objective  (see Balassa 1982).  Typically
1/ A  number  of  country  applications  were  carried  out  by  EPDCO,  see  for
example  Gerken  and  Boray  1987,  Hwa  1987,  Obidegwu  1987,  Cherif  1986,
Clavijo  1986,  Yagci  and  Kamin  1986,  Hwa  and  Cherif  1985.- 14  -
combinations  of exchange  rate depreciation,  reduced  Import  protectlon
via trade policy and export promotion  are supported,  with differing
degrees  of success,  as means to switch  Into production  of tradeabls.
Thls Is natural  since  a deterioration  In the balance  of payments  and
sustainable  growth  rate  of output  are basic  criteria  for the  initiation
of an adjustment  lending  program. One focus  in such  policy  change  has
been  the  reduction of  trade  barriers which  favor  Investment in
Inefficient  production  activities and  create an  anti-export  blus.
Specific  actions supported  in this aspect  of policy  changes  Include
reduction  in tariEf  and non-tariff  barriers,  freer  access  to imported
Inputs for  use  in export production,  the  strengthening  of  export
marketing  and support  institutions,  and changes  ln the mechanism  for
foreign  exchange  determlnation.
Resource mobilization and  use  Is  a  second  element of
macroeconomlc  conditionality,  again with varying effectiveness.  By
providing  encouragement  to savings  and  Investment,  by creating  channels
for a more effclient  use of public  and private  savings  in investment
activities,  productivity  Is sought  to  be increased.  The  policies  target
reforms  of government  expenditures  and taxation,  and Include  measures
for government  revenue  enhancement. The  development  of capital  markets
and elimination  of interest  rate controls  and distortions  Is another
important  aspect  of those  policy  changes. Financial  sector  reforms  have
been  lncreasingly found  necessary to  support other  adjustments.
Rationalization  of  policies involving resource mobilization often
Includes  the removal  of particular  taxes  and subsidies,  recovering  of
costs  through  user charges,  and the phaslng  out of price  and quantity
controls.- is  -
A  third  component  has  been  investment  reallocation,
particularly  as it affects public investment  programs.  Related are
Institutional  reforms,  although  these  have often  been  weak components.
Policy  changes  here  are  meant  to terget  the  organization  and  management
of government  as well  as the  actlvities  of  public  enterprises.  Changes
in the management  and organization  of government  can strengthen  the
institutions  and  staff  charged with  implementing the  adjustaent
program. The size,  extent,  and function  of public  enterprise  activity
are often related  to government  subsidization  policy,  state  enterprise
pricing,  and the availability  of current  and capital  transfers. Thus
rationalization  In resource  mobilization  and  government  investment  also
imolies restraint  on  the  level of  public enterprise  activity and
improvement  in the  quality  and  direction  of their  investment  programs.
These  are related  to iuprovements  sought  in pricing  and institutional
policies  at the sectoral  level.  Sectoral  pricing  reforms  have been
increasingly  important components of  adjustment  lending.  Various
adjustment  programs  have included  technical  assistance  and support,
although this has been a  particularly  weak component in terms of
implementation. Such support  has either  been part of the adjustment
loan,  or be financed  through  a separate  technical  assistance  loan (in
the  case  of  most  SALs).
Relatively  Neglected  Areas
Much  has  been  written  in  recent  years  on  problems  of structural
adjustment:  who are  the  participants  in adjustment,  what  should  be its
magnitude  as well  as timing  and  phasing  (see  for  example  Streeten  1987,- 16  -
Sen 1983). It has  been  noted  (Lele  1988)  that  contrasts  in  experiences
have been overlooked  in policy recommendations. For example,  while
evidence  has  accumulated  on the  responsiveness  of production  and  exports
to price and  exchange rate adjustments,  the influence  of weather,
infrastructure  and institutions  remains  vital in Africa.  The supply
response  of individual  crops  was high, but that of agriculture  in the
aggregate  was  low  in many African countries.  Moreover,  non-price
factors deserve greater attention and  they  include emphasis on
management,  infrastructure,  research  and  extension. Price  and  non-price
factors are complementary,  yet it should  also be noted that from a
policy  viewpoint  they  may turn  out to be substitutes: price  and non-
price incentives  can have opposing  budgetary  implications,  for  example
in situations  where direct taxation  is administratively  difficult  and
the  government  needs  to resort  to trade  taxes  to generate  revenues  to
finance  infrastructure  and  irrigation.
Social  costs  of adjustment  are  being  increasingly  addressed  in
the  literature  and in the Bank's  lending  (World  Bank 1986c,  Demery  and
Addision 1987, Pinstrup-Anderson  1987, Cornea, Jolly  and  Stewart
1987). come  country  examples  also  have  illustrated  the  disproportionate
costs  of adjustment  for the poor.  The  assignment  of costs  to already
existing structural  problems and  to  remedial adjustment  measures,
however, is far  from satisfactory.  The question should also  be
addressed  why  the  effects  of a  deceleration  of  growth  would  trickle  down
more readily  than  would the effects  of an acceleration  of growth.  An
adequate  evaluation  of the poverty  effects  of adjustment  should  also
consider  the costs  of alternative  strategies. But the  poverty  aspects-17  -
deserve  to be considered  together  with the balance  of payments  and
fiscal  effects  of adjustment. The role  of public  expenditure  policies
and  how public  expenditure  programs  could  be reoriented  to benefit  the
poor, even and particularly  during periods of fiscal  austerity  are
subjects  of considerable  importance.
The  size and  pace  of  adjustment is  the  focus of  much
attention.  It was noted that countries  faced an issue of double
adjustment  in the 1980s  --  stemming  from  domestic  policies  in the  first
place;  and  further  compounded  by  a  worsening  international
environment.  Nevertheless,  most  people  seem  ti  argue  for  gradualism  in
adjustment,  both for phasing adjustment  costs and for rendering  the
program  sustainable. On the other  hand,  persuasive  arguments  are also
made  for  more drastic actions from a  political viewpoint.  The
announcement  or perception  of a long drawn out adjustment  process  is
sometimes  more unpalatable  than a once and for all adjustment;  the
latter  can also  deal  more effectively  with the political  opposition  of
vested  interests.
3. The  External  Sector  and  Strategy
Trade  Policy  Reform
Trade strategy provides an  important  link between overall
policy reform (previous  section)  and financing  for adjustment  (next
section).  Adjustment  programs  often provide rationale  for increased
external  financing  which  supports  trade  expansion  as a means  to raising
economic  growth. Aggregate  figures  indicate  that  the  share  of trade  in- 18  -
economic  activity  of fast-growing  countries  has  been  steadily  increasing
(Table  2).  Empirical  studies  give ample  evidence  that open,  outward-
looking  developing  economies  have achieved  better  growth  records  than
more restrlctive  ones. 1/  Evidence  has also been  accumulating  on the
benefits  of low  tariffs  and  fast  growing  exports  on the  one  hand,  and  on
the  costs  of pervasive  controls  and  restrictions  on the  other. The  Bank
has been forcefully  encouraging  developing  countries  to reform  their
economiec gradually  and  adopt more  neutral trade regimes. There  is,
however,  considerable  confusion  on what precisely  Is the nature  of the
recommended  liberalization  and  what  exactly  is being  achieved. More
generally,  the question is being increasingly  asked:  "Beyond  trade
Oiberalization,  what?"
Three  major  components of  trade  reform under  structural
adjustment  may be distinguished:  removal  of impediments  to export;
substitution  of  price for quantitative  controls; and  reduction  of
protection levels and  differentials.  The  above  order may  also
represent,  in many instances,  a viable sequence in liberalization,
especially  in the face of severe  foreign  exchange  constraints. The
removal  of anti-export  bias constitutes  a universal  element  in Bank-
supported  macro,  agricultural  and  trade  adjustment  packages. The  policy
ingredients  usually  are: reduction  in  export  taxes  and  restrictions;  a
real  depreciation  of the  domestic  currency;  and  duty drawback  and other
export  promotion  schemes. The  question  of how  much  export  promotion  can
1/ See  for  example  Little,  Scitovsky  and  Scott  (1970),  Bhagwati  (1978),
Krueger (1978), Donges (1976),  Balassa  (1980),  Corden  1987,  World
Bank  (1987a).- 19  -
Table  2:  DEVELDOPIG  (0NrRIES  - GRf  a/  OF GDP, ECPOES  AM) DOMS
(percent)
1965-81  1982-86 b/
Country  Group  GOP  Export  c/  Iiport  d  GDP  Export  c/  Iqiort  c/
Developing Cotntries  -.
Low  (<2.5)  2.3  2.9  4.0  -0.1  3.1  -5.9
Moderate  (2.6-5.0)  4.2  1.1  5.2  3.1  4.5  -1.1
High  (5.1-7.5)  6.3  5.6  7.5  4.9  7.5  5.5
Very High  (>7.5)  7.6  10.3  12.3  10.4  12.5  12.9
II.  Pogons
Afrlca  4.3  3.5  6.3  -0.7  n.a.  -9.6
Africa  (excl  Nigeria)  4.0  3.0  4.3  0.3  n.ea.  -z.9
Asia  6.2  9.3  11.0  6.9  9.8  .0
EMENA  5.7  5.1  6.9  2.9  5.2  1.7
Latin  America  4.7  2.3  7.4  1.3  3.6  -7.7
III.  Other
Low Income  5.0  3.7  3.8  7.6  8.7  9.1
High Debt  5.7  2.9  7.9  0.9  2.8  -8.6
35 SAL  Countries  5.9  6.9  8al  2.2  5.0  -3.1
15 Major SAL  Countries  6.2  7.8  6.3  2.3  8.6  0.1
EV.  Average d/  5.7  4.8  7.3  3.9  6.5  0.8
n.a.  !'bt  available.
At constant  prices.
Preliminary.
Goods and NFS frm  national  accounts.
90 country  average.
Source:  1ESD, World Bark.
do  for  growth  continues  to  be  raised,  but  the  positive  association
between  export  and  GDP growth  cannot  be  denied  (Table  2).
The  replacement  of  quantitative  restrictions  (QRs)  by  tariffs
is  also  a  fairly  common  policy-proposal.  For  major  recipients  of
adjustment  lending,  nearly  two-thirds  of  the  loans  included  the  goal  of- 20  -
a  relaxatiorn  of QRs in their conditionality. Adjustment  lending  to
Jamaica,  Panama,  Colombia,  Morocco,  Turkey,  Philippines,  Cote d'Ivoire
and Senegal  had specific  understandings  on QR reduction  either  in the
form  of their  elimination  or transference  of items  to  freer  lists. The
actual  system  of restrictions  varies  widely  among  countries,  and there
continues  to be much  confusion  on what exactly  is being  achieved  by  the
changes. Usually  the  process  has been in several,  overlapping,  steps;
sometimes  beginning  with conversion  of prohibitions  to licensing,  and
licensing  to free  imports;  substitution  of tariffs  for  QRs on imports
not  competing  with  domestic  production,  and  then  of  others. Achievement
of reductions  and greater  uniformity  in protection  has been  a complex
goal.  Over two-thirds  of the adjustment  loans  to the  maajor  recipient
countries  containad  tariff  reform  provisions. Several  cases  involved
reducing  the  tariff  band  to say  a minimum  of :-15  percent  and  a  maximum
of 50-60  percent: Jamaica,  Panama,  Morocco,  Philippines,  Thailand  and
Senegal  are prominent  examples.  It has sometimes  been  much easier  to
liberalize  imports  of raw materials  and intermediate  inwuts,  which in
many instances  actually  raises *he effective  protection  rates (and
possibly  their  dispersion)  in the  first  instance.
Economic  analysis  and Bank policy  have  emphasized  the role  of
more open trade  regimes  in development  which has been referred  to in
this  paper. Meanwhile,  some  authors  have  criticized  the  wisdom  of such
emphasis  for  achieving  export  expansion  and  growth.  1/  Recent  trends  in
1/ A forthcoming  volume  by Overseas  Development  Institute  (London)  on
Adjustment  programs,  and  a number  of papers  being  processed  at  WIDER
(Helsinki)  are  cases  in  point;  also  Berg  and  Batchelder  1984,  Please
1984,  Mosley  and  Toye  1986.- 21  -
the world economic  outlook  have added an important  dimension  to this
discussion. There  is growing  concern  whether  the trade  policy  advice
should  be revised  in view of reduced  OECD growth  prospects,  increased
protectionism,  and continuing  terms  of trade  deterioration  on the one
hand,  and strategic  trade  policy  behavior  by some successful  countries
on the  other  (Dornbusch  1987,  Kr'gman  1987). Import  substitution  seems
once  again  to be assuming  a certain  degree  of respectability  as  a trade
strategy.  The  adverse implications  of  slowdown in the developed
countries  on developing  country export growth  may be overdrawn  (see
World Bank 1987).  The nlready  compressed  import  levels  imply little
prospects  for  further  import  reduction.  Moreover,  developing  countries'
debt  burden  and  the  need  to  regain  creditworthiness  add  fresh  urgency  to
achieve  rapid  export  expansion.
Expanding  the  Menu  of  Options
These  set  of issues  concern  the core  of Bank's  policy  advice,
whose importance  has been heightened  by the central  role accorded  to
trade  reforms  in policy-based  lending. Much of the  Bank's  intellectual
and  financial effort over  the  last decade has  been directed in
supporting  an outward eriented and market liberalizing  approach by
individual countries.  Over  time,  however, there appears to  be
Increasing  confusion  about what is meant by outward  orientation  and
liberalization,  about  what is sought  to be achieved,  and  about  what is
being  reformed  and  achieved  as a result. The current  work  programs  are
addressing  these concerns.  From this work, a consensus  or a set of
stylized facts from the conclusions  on  the effects of  the policy- 22 -
packages  would be useful.  A synthesis  of the evidence  in a commonly
understood  analytical  framework  would help in evaluating  actual  reform
experiences  and  guiding  future  policy.
The purpose  of this work is not necessarily  to anticipate  a
revision  of the  Bank's  advice  on trade  policy. The effort,  however,  is
expected  to expand  the scope  of the  policy  discussion  and the  menu of
options,  and  enhance  the  effectiveness  of the  advice. In this  context,
policy  work  is beginning  to  address  some  of the  neglected  questions  that
are being  raised  time  and  again  in and  outside  the  Bank.  What  are the
respective  roles of  price and  non-price  policies in eliciting an
adequate  supply  response  from trade  policy?  What is the recommanded
trade  policy  in the  face  of market  rigidities  and imperfections  at the
sectoral  levels? Going  beyond  trade  poli.cy  per  se,  how  do we bring  in
issues of investment  strategies,  development  of dynamic comparative
advantage,  technology  policy, the role of  foreign investment,  the
regulatory  environment,  risk management,  manpower and training and
enterprise  development?
A second  set of questions  relate  to global  trade  patterns  and
trends,  which  in turn  have  a bearing  on developing  country  policy  (see
Bradford and Branson 1987,  Krugman 1987).  One can point to both
elements  of greater  openness  and  opportunities  in  world  trade  as well  as
an  increasing  inward  orientation  and  protectionism.  Questions  regarding
the true evolving nature of  international  trade,  who  the dominant
participants  are  and what is likely  to drive  market  penetration  on the
part  of different  country  groups  and product  groups  are crucial  to any
long term trade strategy. A few of these  issues  are currently  being- 23  -
addressed  In  PPR. The  purpose  of  this  work  is  not  to  envisage  a  global
coordination  of  production  and  trade  but  to  bring  out  overriding  factors
that  will  determine  the effectiveness  of individual  countries'  trade
strategy. A better  perspective  on the respective  roles  of domestic
policy  as  opposed  to  external  factors  in increasing  trade  is  expected
from  the  ongoing  work. Similarly,  improved  understanding  should  result
on who the  gainers  and losers  are likely  to be from  various  trade
related  lnitiatives.
4. Reform  Process  and  Financing
External  Participants  and  Changing  Roles
The  discussion  to  this  point  has  focussed  mostly  on  the  roles
of  the  member  government  and  the  World  Bank,  used  in  this  paper  as  the
example  of the  external  agency. There  are,  of course,  almost  always
other  actors  In to  the  process. Included  among  these  are the  Fund,
other  official  lenders,  bilateral  lenders,  commercial  banks  foreign
and domestic  --  the  private business  community,  and  relevant
participants  in the  political  system,  both  in  and  out  of government.
Sometimes  financing  arrangements  are  established  under  the  auspices  of
Aid  Consortium  Group  meetings  for  the  countries  in  question.
Adjustment  programs  are  often  initiated  in countries  in the
process  of  macroeconomic  stabilization.  The  Fund  enters  the  dialogue  in
establishing  the  link  between  the  medium-term  program  and  resolution  of
short-run  disequilibria.  :-  general,  the resolution  of short-term
problems  and support  for medium-term  adjus-_ent  are not separable.- 24  -
Short-term  stability  depends  on actions  contingent  on expected  future
conditions.  Medium-term  possibilities  depend on the path taken in
reaching  the future.  While there  is no cross-conditionality  between
Fund facility  agreements  and Bank adjustment  lending,  the implicit
consistency  of stabilization  and adjustment  programs  implies  a linkage
to the  extent  that  analyses  of policies  required  to reach  an equilibrium
position  are  correct.
Coordination  with  other  lending  sources  also  plays  an important
role  in the  dialogue  process. The  Fund  and  Bank  program  analyses  often
provide the  framework  within which coordinated  official action is
predicated.  External  commercial  banks also depend on such program
analyses.  The dialogue on debt restructuring  and Issuance  of new
capital  is not  necessarily  centered  on the  Bank-member  dialogue,  but  to
the extent  that creditworthiness  is linked  to  economic  viability  the
adjustment dialogue and  program are  critical.  Relating policy
conditionality  to  these  players indicates additional roles  which
macroeconomic-based  development aid  plays.  In  particular, the
conditionality  in  adjustment  lending  may  provide  an assurance  of ongoing
participation  by the external  agencies  in evaluating  the evolution  of
economic  conditions  and  assisting  in the  design  of policy  to  meet  those
conditions.
The rhanges that have been taking place in the Bank with
respect  to policy-based  lending reflect  more than a  change in such
lending  from 10 percent to over 20 percent  of total lending.  The
conceptual  change  that  has  been  taking  place  may  have  wider  relevance  to
other  agencies,  and it seems  to have  three  logs. The  first  of these  is- 25  -
the  view  towards  the  economic  environment.  When  project  lending  was  the
main development  activity  there  was an implicit  approach  of designing
the  best  possible  project  given  the  economic  environment  in  which  It  was
going to operate.  It has been recognized  that, in many cases, for
development  to succeed  the overall  economic  environment  must also be
made viable  and that in the absence  of such an economic  environment
project development  alone  is  not  likely to  lead  to  the  desired
objective.
Second, the  perspective  of  development  aid  may have been
becoming  more forward looking and probabilistic.  Going beyond the
Inputs  from  research  and  planning,  the  type  of  vision  that  is  meant  here
may be one that  has grown  out of changes  in economics  as a whole  - a
view  in  which  it  is recognized  that  economic  action  of individuals  (and,
hence,  of economies  as a whole)  are conditional  on expectations  about
the future  as well the past and  present. This is important  because  it
has made clear that for policies to work  there must be economic
institutions  and structures  capable  of influencing  and being  influenced
at  the  level  of the  Individual.
The third  change  has been  a heightened  awareness  of the  value
of  coordinated  action on  the  international  level.  The  Bank has
cooperated  with  other  international  organizations  and  donor  agencies  for
a long  time,  but planning  and coordination  among  those  groups  hae  been
limited.  The effects  of limited  coordination  In project  lending  are
well  known to everyone  with experience  in the area.  A vast collection
of non-standard  production  tools  and infrastructure  projects  lay  rusting
and  crumbling around the world.  In  view of  the  Importance  and-26-
sensitivity  of  adjustment  lending,  the  Bank  and  the  Fund  have  been  drawn
into opening  effective  lines of  communication  and an effort to
understand  each  others'  economic  perspective.  Donor  governments  have
been  finding  it necessary  to reconcile  their  project  financing  with
public investment  programs  which result from adjustment  program
processes.  The  lines  of  communication  and  structure  of  coordination  are
far  from  being  completed,  but  the  needed  direction  has  been  becoming
clearer.
Country  Dialogue  and  Consensus
Conditionality  also  plays  a  key  role  in  the  domestic  acceptance
of  stabilization  and  adjustment  programs.  On  the  one  hand,  the  role  of
an external  agency  in program  design  can lend  credibility  to the
program's  necessity.  This  facet  of  conditionality  can  blunt  pressures
arising  from  required  changes  in  organizational  structure.  It  can  also
play  a role  in  buffering  political  and  popular  oppositimn  to  necessary
change.  This  role  is  sometimes  an  aid  and  sometimes  a  hindrance.  Thus,
on the other  hand, opposition  groups  portraying  conditionality  as
external  pressure  can,  at  times,  succeed  in  blocking  the  adoption  of  an
adjustment  program  or  in  changing  its  characteristics.  It  Is  sometimes
observed,  however,  that  the  credibility  of  an  external  institution  can
assist  a  government  in  meeting  domestic  pressures.  Clearly  the  handling
of  conditionality  is  a  delicate  process.
Consensus building,  which  is  essential to  sustaining
stabilization  and adjustment,  requires  time and  the ability  to
experiment. The pace of reforms  has to take into account  the- 27 -
sustainability  of change  especially  when various Interest  groups are
affected. Taking  as an  example  Colombia's  experience,  private  interests
were represented  in the government  decision process in a  number  of
ways:  the  participation  of private  sector  representatives  on the  bQards
of government  bodies; management  of the Coffee Fund by the coffee
producers together with the  government;  and  rotation  of  personnel
between the publlc and private sectors.  The requirement  for broad
consensus  dictated by the broad representation  of Interests  in the
process  meant  that  policy  changes  were  gradual. In the  case  of Colombia
there has  been a  premium on gradualism in policy change, and on
balancing  economic,  political,  and social  considerations  In order to
avoid  costly  policy  reversals.
The  Case  of Colombia
Every  country  situation  Is  different. The  data  In  Table  1  gave
some idea of how different  the contexts  for adjustment  programs  can
be.  Economic  activity  may  be strong  or sputtering  - thus  Chile  with  no
growth for 1980-83  and Pakistan  with over 7 percent for that same
period. Similarly,  the  external  environment  can  have  varied  effects  on
the situations  - for example,  Mexico and Senegal  enjoying  terms of
trade  gains,  Pakistan,  and  Brazil  relatively  unaffected  by the  slowdown
In  international  trade and Chile especially  hurt by interest  rate
changes in the 1979-82  period.  The resolve  to take action,  and the
socio-political  situation  needed  to  support  such  action  also  differ  from
country  to country. It Is not surprising,  therefore,  that  the  observed
adjustment  varies  widely  In their  scope,  and the results  obtained  are
not  always  comparable.- 28  -
The case of Colombia  is atypical. The country  had not  over-
borrowed  in  the  1970s  and  never  faced  severe  debt-service  problems. Its
debt-service  ratio  in the  early  1980s  was  around  30 percent. While  its
terms of trade declined  sharply in the early 1980s from their high
levels  during  the  coffee  boom  (1976-79),  they  were  similar  to  the  levels
experienced  in the  first  half  of the 19709.
Colombia  followed  a relatively  outward-looking,  growth  oriented
strategy  from the  nid-1960s  to the mid-19709  with good results  (Table
3). Non-coffee  exports, in particular,  took advantage  of the export
promotion policies with expansion in a  wide variety of  products.
Developments  In  the  second  half  of the  1970s,  however,  were  dominated  by
the  boom in earnings  which resulted  inter  alia from  the  jump in coffee
prices.  Colombia's  outward-looking  policies  began  to weaken,  at least
in  part,  as a result  of that  boom.  The policies  undertaken  in the  boom
period  led  to  certain structural weaknesses whilch  were  further
compounded  by developments  in the  early  '80s.  First,  higher  disposable
Incomes  generated  by the boom led to an increase  in the price  of non-
tradeable  goods resulting in an appreciation  of  the real exchange
rate. Second,  the  accumulation  of foreign  exchange,  not  fully  offset  by
higher Imports  or sterilization,  produced increased  domestic  credit
expansion,  higher  Inflation,  and  added to the appreciation  of the real
exchange  rate.  The  growth  in aggregate  deman  was maintained  through
higher  public  expenditures  and foreign  borrowing  after  the coffee  boom
ended.  These actions sustained both  Colombia's inflation and  a
continulng  appreciatlon  of Its  real  exchange  rate.- 29  -
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These  policies,  together  with  worsening  external  conditions  --
falling  commodity prices  and  tighter  capital  markets  --  created  serious
dlfficulties  for  Colombia's  external  sector.  Mainly  In view  of  Latin
America's  debt  problems,  Colombia  suffered  cuts  in  trade  credit  lines
and  commercial  bank  lending.  Non-coffee  exports  declined  and
international  reserves  fell  sharply.  Colombia  began  to  lose  ground  not
only  in  commodities  experiencing  falling  prices,  but  as  a  result  of  the
appreciation  in  the  real  exchange  rate,  in  such  items  as  textlles  in
which  it  traditionally  had  a  comparative  advantage.
In  light  of  this,  Colombia's  trade  regime  needed  reform  in
several  ways:  correction  of  the  exchange  rate,  a  reduction  in  import
restrictions,  better  functioning  of  duty  drawback  schemes,  the  removal
of  export  barriers  and improvements  In export  quality.  Equally
fundamental,  the  underlying  fiscal  deficits  had  to  be  reduced,  along
with  domestic  credit  expansion,  in  order  to  permit  a  reduction  in
inflation  and  an  improvement  in  competitiveness.  Medium-term  support
for  such  macroeconomic  reforms  needed  to  be  provided  through  better
public  investment  programming  and  sectoral  policies.  Adjustment  lending
has  supported  these  policy  reforms  and  facilitated  additional  financing.
5.  Appraisal  of  Adjustment  Effects
It  is  difficult  to  judge  the  success  of  many  adjustment
programs  in  part  because  the  goals  of  those  projrams  lie  in  the  medium-
term  and  in  many cases,  that  point  still  lies  in  the  future.  The  speed
of  actions  also  varies:  one  might,  for  example,  compare  the  gradual- 31  -
changes in Colombia  with more dramatic adjustments  In Chile.  The
analysis  is also complicated  by the fact that the external  world is
continually  changing. Since  programs  are  designed  ex-ante,  the  success
of an approach  has to be measured  relative  to other ex-ante  design
processes.  The measure of success  in terms of outcomes  has to be
measured  relative  to the outcomes  which might have resulted  if other
posited  approaches  had been followed. The evaluation  of the latter  is
not  straight-forward.
The  difflculty  of this  appraisal  does  not  justify  Ignoring  the
issue.  The Bank has attempted  to assess its experience  with both
structural  adjustment  and  sector  adjustment  lending. World  Bank  (1986a)
limited  its  analysis  to fifteen  loans  in ten  countries  initiated  during
1980-83  for which project  performance  audlts  had been undertaken.  A
general  conclusion  reached  was that these  early  programs  did not fully
meet the expectations  of the Bank or the adjusting  countries.  The
reasons for this are not completely  understood  but at least three
factors  stand  out: not  enough  was  known  about  the  span  of time  required
for policy  changes  to become  effective  at the ttme of program  design;
many policy  changes  were Incompletely  or unevenly  implemented;  and the
period  of implementation  (1980-83)  was one in which  the  world  economic
environment  faciag  these  countries  deteriorated.
Reaction  to  those  factors  has  already  been  incorporated  in most
of the programs  which followed  these early efforts.  Although  more
effort is now taken in understanding  the Impact of policy reforms,
program conditions  have included  qualitative  targets as well.  The
number  of targets  specified  In a program  ha  also tended  to decrease.- 32  -
The latter  two trends  reflect  a heightened  awareness  for the need for
flexibility In  the  implementation  of  adjustment programs.  In
conjunction  with the  trend  from  quantitative  to  qualitative  conditions,
efforts  have  been made to improve  the  clarity  of intermediate  goals  ln
programs.  This has also allowed for  a greater  flexibility  in making
mid-course  corrections  when  outcomes  in  terms  of Intermediate  and final
objectives  do  not  seem  to  coincide  with  program  goals.
The Bank's  role  through  the  SALs  has come  under  criticism  from
the outside (see Mosley  and Toye 1986, for  example).  A constructive
point  concerns  the  need  to account  for  individual  country  circumstances
more  fully,  and  to  use  performance  tIrgets  in  addition  to  policy  targets
In conditionality  and evaluation. There is now a general  perception
that too much has been attempted  without adequate  preparation  and,
greater attention to  political feasibility  and a  more cooperative
process  of negotiations  would produce  more sustainable  results. There
are appealing  arguments  for gradualism,  more careful  attention  to non-
price factors  and greater  emphasis  on expenditure  programs  to protect
the poor, as well as better coordination  between  macroeconomic  and
sectoral  policies.  Continued emphasis  on project lending  has also
considerable  validity.
One has to be cautious,  however,  about  inconsistencies  in some
of the  criticisms. While  also arguing  that  the SALs  were overburdened
with conditionality,  some  urge the Bank's  Involvement  in a variety  of
new  socio-political  and  ethical areas  connected with  adjustment.
Inconsistencies  are also apparent  on many of the criticisms  on trade
policy.  Trade liberalization  Is often blamed to have hurt domestic- 33  -
production  and  external  balances.  At  the  sam  time,  little
liberalization  was  achieved,  accordlng  to  others.  Table  4  Indicates
that  during  1982-86  the  SAL countries  have  increased  their  export  shares
significantly,  while  their  import  shares  In  GDP  have  increased
modestly.  Liberalization  seems  to  have  been  selective,  applicable  in
the  first  instance  to  inputs  needed  In  production.  Although  there  are
individual  examples  of  excessively  rapid  liberalization,  this  by  no
means  seems  to  have  happened  In  general.
Table 4:  lMD3 SHAS IN GOP
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More  generally,  the Bank has become more sensitive  to the
limitations  of Its understanding  with respect  to adjustment  policies.
Its experience  has shown  the complexity  inherent  in designing  measures
to  deal  wlth  rector and  system-wide problems.  The  continuing
fundamental  importance  of good project  lending is being increasingly
noticed. Just as a  sound  macroeconomic  environment  was found  essential
for successful  project  lending,  so is the latter  needed  to carry out
vital assistance  that cannot  be provided  by the former.  It has also
become  more  aware  of the  uncertainties  associated  with  the  international
environment  and their effects on economic  performance.  Accumulated
experience  has  also  led  to  increased awareness of  the  political
sensitivity of  particular policy  choices and  the  effects  such
sensitivities  can  have  on the  speed  of policy  Implementation.
Although  recent  experience  with program  lending  may not have
been  fully  satisfactory,  it  should  not  be inferred  that  such  lending  was
not worthwhile.  World Bank  (1988) is  an  interim report on  the
accomplishments  of adjustment  lending  as well as areas for continued
improvement. Some programs  have been extremely  successful. Turkey,
which  has  had five  structural  adjustment  loans  and three  sector  loans,
Is  probably  one  example  of such  success,  and  Colombia,  Ghana,  Korea  and
Thailand  are perhaps others.  Other programs,  while not completely
meeting  expectations, have  made  Important contributions to  the
development  potential  of the  adjusting  economies. In  a number  of cases
improved  performance  is  already noted, although a  causal relation
between policy and performance  is  hard to establish.  Among  the
contributions  has been the Institution  building  which  has accompanied- 35  -
adjustment  lending.  Instltution  building  has.  not only included  the
streamlining  of bureaucratic  structure  and  strengthening  of planning  and
budgeting  capabilities.  It has also included  the introduction  and
upgrading  of research  and  development  capabilities.  The  effects  of such
changes may not be obvious in ths near term, but their auccessful
Implementation  is critical  for development  viability  over the longer-
term.
Concomitant  with  institution building there  has  come  a
heightened  awareness  on the part of governments.  An awareness  not
restricted  to the  effects  of adjustment  related  policies,  but  rather  an
understanding  of possibilities  of moving from the status  qdo.  An
awareness  that economies  could be opened and benefit  from external
interface  without sacrificing  political,  social,  or cultural  Identity
and characteristics.  There has also come a nascent  understanding  of
incentive  mectianisas  and the potential  for growth  arising from more
efficient  resource  use.  Along with such understanding  has come an
awareness  of the  countriesE  abilities  to affect  development.
The  past  decade  has  removed  any  residual  naivete  and all  of the
participants  In the developnant  process  now recognize  that  development
is  not  just  a  matter  of building  enough  hydro-electric  schemes  or adding
miles to a  railroad  network.  Everyone  now knows that development
entails  "completion"  in a fuller  sense.  It means flnding  the way In
which countries  can realize their  potential.  This means individuals
within  countries  acquiring  information  and  skills  in  transforming  their
environment. It  means  the  development  of a system  which  can  coordinate
and promote  the actlvities  of those individuals. It may also mean- 36  -
findlg  ways  In which countries  can gain from and contribute  to tthe
activltles  which  take  place  outside  their  borders.
Many  countries  have  engaged  in adjustment  dialogue  only because
the future  without  the resources  that  dialogue  could  bring seemed  too
dire.  Other countries  have not reached  a point  where  choices  between
the status  quo and change seem so clearly  to be needed.  Everyone,
however,  is paying  close  attention  to the  performance  of those  who  have
made changes in  the  policies that govern the  function of  their
economtes.  Thus adjustment  lending  has brought about a  chance to
demonstrate  the potential  effects  of adjustmeut  policies  --  and more
generally,  of sound  development  pollcies. It  provides  a test both  for
how much policy  change  is feasible  and for its effects.  Its results
also  depend  on  cooperation  among  governments,  international
organizations,  and  the  commercial Institutions.  It  requires the
patience to  listen to and  understand  differing perspectives.  It
requires  the flexibility  to consider  4.a  expanded  menu of options  for
development. It requires  Insight  and luck.  But there  seem to be no
acceptable  alternatives  to  this  course  of action.- 37  -
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